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Price level targeting has been proposed as an alternative to inﬂation targeting that may
confer beneﬁts if a central bank sets policy under discretion, even if society’s loss function
is speciﬁed in terms of inﬂation (instead of price level) volatility. This paper demonstrates
the sensitivity of this argument. If even a small portion of agents use a rule-of-thumb to
form inﬂation expectations, or does not fully understand the nature of the target, price
level targeting may in fact impose costs on society rather than beneﬁts. While rational
expectations and perfect credibility are generally beneﬁcial with either a price level or
an inﬂation target, an inﬂation target is more robust to alternative assumptions. These
results suggest that caution should be exercised in considering a price level target as the
basis for monetary policy, unless society has preferences speciﬁed in terms of price level,
rather than inﬂation, volatility.
Keywords: Price Level Targeting, Inﬂation Targeting, Credibility, Free Lunch, Discretion
JEL code: E52
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In recent times, a growing number of central banks have commenced explicitly tar-
geting inﬂation as a means to improving economic performance. Associated with this
has been growing central bank credibility, as explicit targets have been achieved, and de-
viations from the targets have been clearly articulated (see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin,
and Posen (1999) and Johnson (1998) for evidence of this).
Some have argued that central banks should go further. One characteristic of an
inﬂation target is that past mistakes are ignored: if inﬂation lies above or below the
target one period, the inﬂation target for the following period does not change. In a
world in which there are nominal rigidities, optimal policy will generally include some
degree of history dependence, so that current policy should condition on past mistakes.
One special case of a history dependent monetary policy that has received particu-
lar attention is price level targeting. Several recent papers have focused on the potential
beneﬁts of the central bank targeting the price level when the central bank operates un-
der discretion, even if society’s loss function is speciﬁed in terms of inﬂation variability.
Svensson (1999), using a Neo Classical Phillips curve, argued that there is an advantage
to doing so provided the output gap is suﬃciently persistent, and labeled this a “free
lunch.” Others have found even stronger support for price level targeting when agents
are forward looking. These papers utilize variants of the New Keynesian framework, out-
lined in Roberts (1995) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). This framework assumes
that changing prices is costly, so prices that are set today reﬂect future expectations of
inﬂation. For example, Dittmar and Gavin (2000) ﬁnd that the inﬂation-output variabil-
ity trade-oﬀ is better with a price level target than an inﬂation target. They argue that
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the economy yet is beneﬁcial in reducing inﬂation volatility.
Vestin (2000), using a similar framework, ﬁnds that price level targeting under discre-
tion outperforms inﬂation targeting under discretion. In some cases, he ﬁnds that price
level targeting under discretion can result in the same outcome as inﬂation targeting
under commitment, provided the parameters of the loss function are suitably adjusted.
In a related paper, Barnett and Engineer (2001) provide a summary of the literature
and consider a hybrid New Keynesian – Neo Classical Phillips curve. They argue that
optimal monetary policy precludes long-run price-level drift if inﬂation expectations are
suﬃciently forward looking, among other contexts.
The existing literature has assumed that agents are fully rational and that the central
bank enjoys perfect credibility. Therefore whether a central bank has an inﬂation target
or a price level target, agents are assumed to know the target, and form expectations
that condition on it. Here the robustness of the results is considered. Suppose, for
example, that constructing rational expectations of inﬂation requires substantial costs.
Then a portion of economic agents may use rules-of-thumb to form expectations, rather
then constructing rational expectations. Alternatively, suppose that agents do not know
or believe the stated target of the central bank. They would then base their inﬂation
expectations on a policy target that diﬀers from the true target of the central bank.
A number of examples of rule-of-thumb forecasting and imperfect credibility are
considered below. I ﬁnd that in nearly all cases considered, the existing results are
sensitive. As the assumptions in the existing literature are relaxed, the “free lunch”
rapidly loses its culinary value, especially if inﬂation volatility has a high weight in
ECB • Working Paper No 284 • November 2003 6society’s loss function. While the presence of rule-of-thumb forecasters or imperfect
credibility is typically costly with either an inﬂation or a price level target, it is especially
so with a price level target.
The basic model, demonstrating the potential role for price level targets, follows.
Section 3 discusses history-dependent monetary policy, section 4 considers the impact
of rule-of-thumb forecasting, while section 5 considers imperfect credibility. Conclusions
then follow.
2. A Simple New-Keynesian Model
Here I describe a simple linear-quadratic, forward-looking model similar to that in
Vestin (2000) in which price level targeting can play a role in improving the trade-oﬀ
between output and inﬂation variability faced by the central bank when monetary policy
is set under discretion. The economy is assumed to consist of a Phillips curve given by
πt = βEt(πt+1)+κxt + ut, (1)
where πt is inﬂation, xt is the output gap and ut is an exogenous shock term that
is known by the central bank. Expectations of future inﬂation are assumed rational,
and all variables are expressed in logs. For simplicity, xt can be considered the policy
instrument of the central bank.





[(πt+i − π∗)2 + λx2
t+i], (2)
subject to (1), for some inﬂation target π∗. Note that I am assuming, as in Svensson
(1999) and Vestin (2000), that inﬂation targeting or price level targeting central banks
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where λ = 0. Under discretionary policy, the central bank is assumed to lack the means
to commit to future policy actions. Optimal monetary policy will therefore minimize the
period loss function, taking the form
xt =
κ(1 − β)





while inﬂation evolves according to
πt =
κ2




























t−1 + π∗. The appropriate quadratic period loss function is then given by
Lt =( pt − p∗
t)2 + λx2
t, (6)
where λ is appropriately scaled to reﬂect the diﬀerence between the magnitude of price
level and inﬂation rate volatility. In constrast to inﬂation targeting, even in the absense
of commitment technology, today’s policy aﬀects losses in future periods, implying the
presence of state variables in the model. We follow the methodology of Currie and Levine
(1993), and ﬁnd that under optimal discretionary monetary policy, the paths of output
and inﬂation are deﬁned by
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We can now consider the policy frontiers obtained under either a price level or an
inﬂation target. The parameters considered here are the same as in Vestin (2000): κ = 1
3;
β =1 ;π∗ = 0; and 0 ≤ λ ≤∞ . To construct the policy frontier, the economy is simulated
1000 times for 100 periods for diﬀerent levels of λ, and the average level of output and
inﬂation volatility in the ﬁnal period is computed. 100 periods is suﬃcient to ensure that
the results are independent of the starting point, while averaging across 1000 simulations
results in policy frontiers that are virtually indistinguishable from those that may be
obtained analytically. While analytical solutions may be easily obtained for this base
case, they are diﬃcult to obtain for some of the cases that follow; hence the reliance on
numerical results.
Figure 1 contains the policy frontiers for the base model. Over the entire range
of possible values of λ, a price level target results in a better trade-oﬀ between output
volatility and inﬂation volatility than an inﬂation target. Note that the graphs given here
are in terms of the standard deviations of output and inﬂation rather than the variances,
to aid interpretation. Hence the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation volatility with an
inﬂation target obtained here is a straight line, whereas Vestin (2000) obtained a convex
relation.
Note also that the outcome with strict inﬂation targeting coincides with that when
there is strict price level targeting- in either case, inﬂation volatility equals zero, while
output volatility is at its highest level.
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To illustrate the history dependence of a price level target, note that (8) above can
be rewritten as
πt =( φ1 − 1)(pt−1 − p∗
t−1)+φ1ut +( φ2 + π∗). (9)
In comparison with the inﬂation path under inﬂation targeting given by (4), there is an
additional argument representing the diﬀerence between the price level target and the
realised price level in the previous period.
Also, with inﬂation targets, if agents discount the future and the central bank cares
about both inﬂation and output (β<1a n dλ>0), the weight on π∗ in (4) is less than
one, and the expected long-run average inﬂation rate is less than π∗. By contrast, with
price level targeting the expected long-run average inﬂation rate is equal to π∗.T os e e
this, (8) may be rewritten as





which has an unconditional expectation of π∗. With price level targeting, the average
inﬂation rate may deviate substantially from π∗ in the short run, while the long run
average inﬂation rate will tend to π∗. This is because the further the price level deviates
from the target path, the greater will be the loss to the central bank, and therefore the
size of the monetary policy response to bring the price level back to the desired price
path (and the inﬂation rate back to π∗).
One important point to note is that price level targeting is just one example of a
history-dependent monetary policy, and not all history-dependent monetary policies are
equal. Suppose, for example, that the central bank were to seek to attain a time-varying
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π∗
t = π∗
t−1 − πt−1 + π∗. (11)
One could think of this as a price level target, speciﬁed in inﬂation terms. Under these
circumstances, the optimal policy under discretion would result in the policy frontier in
Figure 2. Clearly the outcome is worse than with either an inﬂation target or a price
level target, over the full range of possible values of λ. The intuition behind this result
is that the expectations term in the Phillips curve is given by
Et(πt+1)=Et(pt+1) − pt. (12)
With a target expressed in inﬂationary terms and discretionary monetary policy, this
entire term is taken to be exogenous by the central bank. In contrast, if the target is
expressed in price level terms, optimal discretionary policy takes account of the impact
of the current price level on future expectations (for example, from (8) with p∗
t =0 ,
Et(πt+1)=( φ1 − 1)pt). Therefore price level targeting incorporates more information
than inﬂation targeting, and results in a better trade-oﬀ. Note that this eﬀect would
be obtained whenever expectations are forward looking. If expectations were backward
looking, then pursuing a price level target in inﬂation terms would result in no loss to
the central bank.
4. Rule-Of-Thumb Forecasting
The base result outlined above assumes that agents form rational expectations of
inﬂation. This assumes complete knowledge of the structure of the economy, the loss
function of the central bank, and the size of the shock term. Suppose that gathering this
ECB • Working Paper No 284 • November 2003 11information were costly. Then it is possible that optimizing agents may follow simple
rules-of-thumb in forming expectations. Two such cases are considered below, for β =1 .
When inﬂation expectations are biased towards current inﬂation
I ﬁrst consider the case where a portion (1 − ω) of agents expect future inﬂation to
be equal to its current level. Then aggregate inﬂation expectations are biased away from
their rational expectation towards the current inﬂation rate. This may result if some
agents have short memory, or perceive changes in the inﬂation rate to reﬂect a change
in the inﬂation target, for example.
In the New Keynesian framework, agents set prices today based on what they expect
inﬂation to be in the future. If some agents expect future inﬂation to be equal to current
inﬂation, they will set prices accordingly, and inﬂation expectations will appear to be less
forward looking. In what follows I will assume that the agents who are forward looking
(including the central bank) are sophisticated in that they take account of the eﬀect of
less sophisticated agents when forming their expectations. Replacing (1) above with the
following
πt =[ ωEt(πt+1)+( 1− ω)πt]+κxt + ut, (13)
and solving the model for diﬀerent values of ω captures diﬀering levels of credibility. The








one can see why. A reduction in credibility here increases the slope of the phillips curve
and also the potency of inﬂation shocks. But these changes have equal eﬀects on the
policy frontier with either a price level or an inﬂation target. Therefore the “free lunch”
remains. Figure 3 illustrates these results for diﬀering values of ω.
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Now consider the case where some agents’ expectations of future inﬂation are biased
away from their rational expectation towards the long-run average inﬂation rate, while
others form inﬂation expectations that take into account the current policy target. This
may result if agents are not sophisticated enough to form rational expectations, or do
not know the model or size of the shock term.
In this model, which is linear and entails symmetric shock terms and additive un-
certainty, as β → 1 the average long-run rate of inﬂation is π∗ with either a price-level
or an inﬂation target. Replacing the Phillips Curve in (1) with
πt = ωEt(πt+1)+( 1− ω)π∗ + κxt + ut (15)
where (1 − ω) is the portion of unsophisticated agents, we can solve the model with an









which are identical to the case of ω = 1. This is because inﬂation targeting implies that
agents’ rational expectation of next period’s inﬂation rate is simply the inﬂation target,
which is also the long-run average inﬂation rate. Hence inﬂation expectations being
biased towards the long-run average inﬂation rate does not introduce any distortion into
the model.
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The policy frontiers for diﬀerent values of ω are given in Figure 4. We see here
that as the portion of agents who take account of the target when forming expectations
declines, the “free lunch” resulting from following a price level target diminishes.
5. Imperfect Credibility
The base result outlined in section 2 assumes that agents form rational expectations
that condition on the true central bank target. That is, the central bank has perfect
credibility. While there is some evidence that the credibility enjoyed by many central
banks has improved in recent years, few would believe that credibility is perfect. In
reality, if inﬂation were to remain away from the target for a period of time or were to
move far from a constant target due to a particular realization of shocks, some agents
may interpret this as a change in the target. Also, if a central bank were to introduce
a price level target, even if it had previously enjoyed high credibility for an inﬂation
target, it would not necessarily enjoy immediate credibility for its new target. To the
extent that credibility must be attained for the new target, the expectations channel by
which price level targeting delivers superior output and inﬂation variability to inﬂation
targeting may be weakened.
One can think of credibility in a number of diﬀerent ways, two of which will be
explored here. In each case, agents do not believe the target price path of the central
bank, and base their expectations on an alternative price path, in terms of either the
starting point or the growth rate.
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One form of credibility that is important with a price level target but of little impor-
tance with an inﬂation target is the starting point of the price path. Because bygones are
bygones with an inﬂation target, the starting point (in terms of the price level) is relevant
for one period only, while with a price level target it is relevant for all periods. I consider
the situation where agents form expectations based on the belief that the starting point
of the price path diﬀers from the true one by an amount δ. Therefore expectations are




t + δ, (19)
and agents’ expectations consistently exceed the true target.
With an inﬂation target, the results are as in (3) and (4) above beyond the ﬁrst
period. With a price level target, expectations are formed based on an incorrect target,
and policy is set optimally, conditional on the forecasts. The solution to the policy
problem is outlined in Appendix 2.
Figure 5 shows the policy frontiers for δ =0 .001 (0.1%), δ =0 .01 (1%), and δ =0 .1
(10%) respectively. A small bias in the perceived anchor for the desired price level path
results in a rapid loss of the “free lunch” from pursuing a price level target, but has no
impact with an inﬂation target. This points to the importance for a central bank to
credibly communicate the desired price path under a price level target.
The behavior of the economy in the United Kingdom during the return to the Gold
Standard after World War I may be thought of as an example of the economic cost of
the cost of the public not believing the starting point of the target price path (see Smith
1998 for a discussion).
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An alternative form of credibility that is important with either a price level target
or an inﬂation target is the growth rate. In the case of an inﬂation target, this will have
a negative impact on the policy frontier that is uniform (in expectation) over time. With
a price level target, the impact of imperfect credibility on output and inﬂation volatility
will increase over time, as the perceived target and the actual target diverge. Clearly a
price level target will then generally be costly relative to an inﬂation target.
In the two examples above, imperfect credibility results in agents making systematic
errors in forecasting inﬂation. While this may be realistic in the short-run (for example,
immediately after adopting an inﬂation target), this is likely to be unrealistic in the
long run, since agents may be expected to learn about the inﬂation target over time. A
less extreme form of imperfect credibility, with agents making non-systematic errors in
predicting the target price level growth rate (π∗), may occur with a time-varying inﬂation
target, for example. To be precise, suppose
Et(π∗
t+1)=π∗
t+1 + δt,δ t ∼ N(0,σ2
δ). (20)
With an inﬂation target, δt will be equivalent from the central bank’s point of view




(ut + δt), (21)
πt = π∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ
(ut + δt). (22)
With a price level target, the price level the price and output paths may be solved in an
analygous fashion to Appendix 2; see Appendix 3 for details.
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σδ =0 .01 (1%). Once again, the results illustrate the fragility of the monetary policy
free lunch.
6. Conclusions
Price level targeting has been proposed as an alternative to inﬂation targeting that
may confer beneﬁts where a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss
function is speciﬁed in terms of inﬂation (instead of price level) volatility. This paper
demonstrates the sensitivity of this argument to the expectations formation process of
agents. If even a small portion of agents believes that inﬂation will continue in the future
at current levels, or does not fully understand the nature of a price level target, price level
targeting may in fact impose costs on society rather than beneﬁts, especially if inﬂation
volatility has a high weight in society’s loss function. While rational expectations and
perfect credibility are generally beneﬁcial with either a price level or an inﬂation target,
an inﬂation target is more robust to alternative assumptions.
These results suggest that caution should be exercised in considering a price level
target as the basis for monetary policy, unless society has preferences speciﬁed in terms
of price level (rather than inﬂation) volatility.
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To solve the price level targeting model under optimal discretionary policy, optimal
discretionary monetary policy will satisfy
Vt = minEt[Lt + βVt+1], (A1)
where the relevent terms of Vt are
Vt = γ1(pt−1 − p∗
t−1)2 +2 γ2(pt−1 − p∗
t−1)+... (A2)











t−1)+κxt + ut +[ βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗]

. (A4)
Substituting (A2) (iterated forward) and (A4) into (A1) and diﬀerentiating with respect
to xt yields the optimal discretionary policy rule




κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2, (A6)
θ2 = −
κ(1 + βγ1)[βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗]+κβγ2(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A7)
Substituting (A5) back into (A4) yields
(pt − p∗
t)=
λ(1 + β − βφ1)






λ(1 + β − βφ1)[βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗] − κ2βγ2
κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A8)
ECB • Working Paper No 284 • November 2003 19Interating forward one period, taking expectations, and combining with (A3) yields
φ1 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2, (A9)
φ2 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)[βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗] − κ2βγ2
κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A10)
Finally, substituting (A2) iterated forward, (A5), and (A8) back into (A1) and equating




γ2 =( 1+βγ1)φ1φ2 + λθ1θ2 + βγ2φ1. (A12)
Solving these numerically, we then have the law of motion for both prices and output
and can calculate output and inﬂation volatility.
Appendix 2
Agent’s inﬂation expectations are formed under the assumption that the actual
target is equal to the perceived target. From (A8),
Et(pt+1 − ˆ p∗
t+1)=φ1(pt − ˆ p∗
t)+φ2, (A13)










On the other hand, the central bank takes expectations as given and optimizes monetary




ECB • Working Paper No 284 • November 2003 20for some ˆ φ2. Combining (A15) with (5) and equating coeﬃcients with (A14) implies
ˆ φ2 = φ2 + δ(1 − φ1), (A16)
with corresponding new values implied for the other constant coeﬃcients (ˆ θ2 and ˆ γ2)a s
well. The paths of output and inﬂation are then functions of φ1, θ1, ˆ φ2,a n dˆ θ2.
Appendix 3
In this case, (A13) implies that prices follow
Et(pt+1 − p∗
t+1)=φ1(pt − p∗




The relevent terms of the the value function are
Vt = γ1(pt−1 − p∗
t−1)2 +2 γ2(pt−1 − p∗






xt = θ1[(pt−1 − p∗






κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2, (A20)
θ4 =
−βκ[(1 + βγ1)(1 − φ1)+γ3(1 + β − βφ1)]
κ2(1 + βγ1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 , (A21)
γ3 =( 1+βγ1)φ1(1 − φ1)+λθ1θ4 + βγ3φ1. (A22)
The solutions to φ1, φ2, θ1, θ2, γ1 and γ2 coincide with those in Appendix 1.
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